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In Batty (2010b), I argue that there are no olfactory illusions. Central to the traditional
notions of illusion and hallucination is a notion of object-failure—the failure of an
experience to represent particular objects. Because there are no presented objects in the
case of olfactory experience, I argue that the traditional ways of categorizing non-veridical
experience do not apply to the olfactory case. In their place, I propose a novel notion
of non-veridical experience for the olfactory case. In his (2011), Stevenson responds to
my claim that there are no olfactory illusions. Although he agrees that it is natural—or at
least commonplace—to think there are no olfactory illusions, he argues that there are and
provides examples of them, many of which he suggests have analogs in the visual and
auditory domains. In this paper, I examine the nature of the disagreement between us.
I argue that Stevenson fails to argue against my conclusion that there are no olfactory
illusions.




Let me begin with an overview of my previous arguments1.
In Batty (2010a), I argue for a view according to which olfac-
tory experience has representational content—that is, there is
a way that the world appears to a subject when she has an
olfactory experience. I set this discussion against suggestions pre-
viously in the literature (albeit brief) that olfactory experience
may have no representational content—that is, that there is no
way that the world appears to a subject when she has an olfac-
tory experience 2. These are views according to which olfactory
experiences are “mere sensations,” or “raw feels.” I argue that driv-
ing these suggestions are differences between visual and olfactory
phenomenology—that is, differences in what these two kinds of
experiences are like for the subject. Visual experience is incred-
ibly rich, seemingly offering up an array of three-dimensional
objects. For this reason, the view that visual experience is world-
directed—indeed directed at the objects in our environment—
comes naturally to us, with the most common version of such
1It must be noted that all of my previous arguments concern human olfaction.
I will have something to say about the olfaction of other creatures at the end
of the paper.
2For example, both Peacocke (1983) and Lycan (1996, 2000) suggest that the
phenomenology of olfactory experience does not uphold a representational
view. In the opening chapter of his Sense and Content (1983), Peacocke sug-
gests that “a sensation of [smell] may have no representational content of any
sort, though of course the sensation will be of a distinctive kind” (3). This is all
he has to say, however. Still, his remarks suggest a sensational view of olfactory
experience. Echoing Peacocke, Lycan claims that “phenomenologically speak-
ing, a smell is just a modification of our consciousness, a qualitative condition
or event in us” (2000, 281), “lingering uselessly in themind without represent-
ing anything” (1996, 245). Lycan does go on to argue that olfactory experience
is representational; but it is clear from these remarks that he thinks that we
cannot uphold such a view on the basis of the phenomenology of olfactory
experience. He, in turn, proposes that the appropriate notion of content for
olfactory experience is a teleological one (1996).
a view the representational, or content, view. The case of olfac-
tory experience is different. Although we might think that it
presents a wealth of apparent properties, it does so with much less
structure than its visual counterpart. As I have put it elsewhere,
compared to visual experience, olfactory experience is “just plain
smudgy.”
Despite this, I argue that there is a representational view of
olfactory experience available and, as it turns out, we are able to
draw that view from a certain debate about visual content. In the
visual domain, there is significant disagreement about how visual
experience represents that objects are thus and so. One view is
that visual content is abstract and that your visual experience of
a ripe tomato, for example, represents that there is “something or
other” at a given location that it is red, round, and so on. This
view is contrasted with the view that visual content is object-
involving. On this view, the tomato itself (that very thing, there,
before you) is a constituent of the content of your experience.
That is, your experience represents that the particular tomato is
at a given location and it is red, round, and so on. Unlike what the
abstract view claims, your experience does not represent merely
that “something or other” has those properties.
Drawing on several examples, I argue that olfactory experience
does not represent particular objects in the way that some have
argued vision does and, as a result, an object-involving view of
olfactory experience is not available3. These examples all draw on
what we might call day-to-day, or typical, olfactory experiences—
namely, those that we have out in the world and not those that
3These examples all show that olfaction cannot solve the Many Properties
Problem—that is, the problem of distinguishing between scenes in which the
same properties are instantiated, but in different arrangements. Vision can
solve this problem, and it does so by grouping perceptual features together
in space. This grouping amounts to the presentation of sensory individuals.
Olfaction, I argue, does not achieve this kind of perceptual grouping. For these
examples, see Batty (2010a, 2011).
www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 231 | 1
Batty The illusion confusion
we might have in a controlled laboratory environment4. As most
of us will never find ourselves in the laboratory environment,
there remains an interesting question regarding the content of
our typical olfactory experiences. Examining these typical cases
olfactory experiences, I demonstrate that everyday olfactory expe-
riences do not possess the robust spatial representation present in
the visual case and, as a result, does not allow us to single out par-
ticular objects in our environment5. That is to say, unlike visual
experience, olfactory experience does not reveal the particular
objects that, in the case of veridical experience at least, bear the
olfactory properties that it presents. This claim, I argue, is just the
claim that olfactory experience does not achieve figure-ground
segregation. Still, as I argue, an abstract view is a remarkably
good fit for the olfactory case and suggestions that olfactory expe-
rience is merely sensational incorrectly cast an object-involving
view as the only option for olfactory experience. The right view
about the representational content of olfactory experience, I con-
clude, is one according to which it has a weak form of abstract
content. In any circumstance, a given olfactory experience repre-
sents that there is something or other “here,” or “at” the perceiver,
that has certain olfactory properties. I call this the abstract view of
olfactory content.
In Batty (2010b), I turn to issues of misrepresentation with
respect to the typical olfactory experience. In particular, I argue
that the abstract view of olfactory content explains some of our
intuitions about how olfactory experience can misrepresent the
world. I point out that the notion of an olfactory hallucination
is something that comes naturally to us while the notion of an
olfactory illusion does not. This is reflected in the scientific litera-
ture on olfaction, in which reference to hallucination is common,
but illusion rare. It has also been reflected in the philosophical
domain—albeit in personal conversation and not in print—with
a hesitancy in answering the question “Are there olfactory illu-
sions?” As we know, the answer to the visual analog is quick and
easy: yes there are visual illusions, and there are many examples
at the ready. In my experience, the olfactory question is met with
a sense of cautiousness, even confusion, over just what the ques-
tion itself is asking. Whether there are olfactory hallucinations,
however, is met with immediate assurances that there are.
Taking this discrepancy as a datum, I argue that the abstract
view of olfactory content can explain the discomfort we have
with the notion of an olfactory illusion as well as the apparent
comfort we have with its counterpart—the olfactory hallucina-
tion. What the abstract view shows us is that, in the case of
olfactory experience, the traditional distinction between illusory
and hallucinatory experience does not apply. In turn, it directs
our attention to a novel notion of non-veridicality—one that
has been absent from philosophical discussions of illusion and
hallucination.
4As I cite in my previous paper (Batty, 2010b), studies suggest that that
humans are able to achieve some measure of spatial discrimination in highly
controlled laboratory settings. See, for example, Porter et al. (2005) and von
Békésy (1964).
5Unless it is important to otherwise note, in what follows, my use of “olfactory
experience” or “olfactory experiences” will denote those typical, day-to-day,
olfactory experiences.
Traditionally, philosophers have thought that a perceptual
experience can misrepresent, or be non-veridical, in one of two
ways: the experience can be illusory or it can be hallucinatory.
To take a common example, a navy blue sock can look back to
you. What you suffer in this case is an illusion with respect to the
sock’s color. The sock is there, but your visual experience “gets
its color wrong”; the experience attributes a property to the sock
that the sock does not have. In the case of a hallucination, there
is no object there and your experience is not accurate even in
that sense. Macbeth famously suffers in just this way; there is
no dagger before him and when it appears as though there is,
he undergoes a hallucination. Central to the traditional notions
of illusion and hallucination, then, is a notion of object-failure;
in each, an experience fails in representing a particular object.
This much illusion and hallucination have in common. But the
nature of that object-failure falls into two kinds. In the case of
illusion, a visual experience misattributes a property to an exis-
tent object. In the case of hallucination, experience reports that
there is an object there, when there is no such object. This differ-
ence in the kind of object-failure committed marks what I call the
“traditional distinction” between illusion and hallucination.
In order to see why the traditional distinction does not apply
to the olfactory case, consider for a moment the visual case. In
the case of the typical visual experience, we can ask two separate
questions of the object of experience, o:
For any property F that o appears to have, does o really have F?
(V-Attribution)
Is o there at all? (V-Existence)
If the answer to either is “no,” then visual experience fails to
present an object accurately. As I put it above, it commits object-
failure. But, as we know, they commit object-failure in different
ways. If the answer to V-Attribution is “no,” my experience mis-
attributes a property to an existent object. And if the answer
to V-Existence is “no” my experience reports that an object is
present when it is not. This difference in the kind of object-
failure committed—the difference between visual illusion and
visual hallucination—is marked by the different content of V-
Attribution and V-Existence, in what we ask of a given object of
experience.
Now consider the olfactory case. If there were olfactory analogs
of V-Attribution and V-Existence, we could ask of an object of
olfactory experience, x:
For any olfactory property F that x appears to have, does x
really have F? (O-Attribution)
Is x there at all? (O-Existence)
But, as I have argued previously, olfactory experience only ever
reports that there is something or other at a perceiver that is F.
This is unlike the visual case where a perceiver’s experience typ-
ically represents particular objects in one’s environment. That
is to say, unlike visual experience, olfactory experience is disen-
gaged from any particular object. This is why an object-involving
account of its content is unsuitable. In what follows, I will refer
to this point as the claim that there are no “presented objects” in
olfactory experience6.
6Although we might say that, on the abstract view, olfactory experience
presents objects, I intend “presented objects” and its counterpart “presents
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This explains why we are uncomfortable with the notion of
an olfactory illusion. The idea that a smell is misattributed to an
object does not grip us and this is because the content of olfac-
tory experience does not support this kind of claim. That is, in
olfactory experience, there is no particular thing of which we can
ask, as in V-Attribution, “it appears to be F, but is it really as it
appears?” For this reason, I conclude that there are no olfactory
illusions7.
But, now we are faced with a puzzle. This is because, for the
same reasons, there are also no olfactory hallucinations. There is
no particular thing of which we can ask, as in V-Existence, “yes,
it appears to be there, but is it?” But, as I have argued, the notion
of an olfactory hallucination is a notion that we are comfortable
with. If what I say about the illusion case is right, however, it ought
not to be.
The abstract view of olfactory content can solve the puzzle.
As we have seen, the abstract view draws attention to the kinds
of questions that we are unable to ask of olfactory experience—
namely, questions that refer to particular objects. But, as any
account of content will, it also draws attention to the kinds of
questions that we are able to ask in evaluating an olfactory expe-
rience. And, considering these questions, I argue, is the key to
solving the puzzle.
What questions are we able to ask, then? Given the content
of olfactory experience, we can ask of a given olfactory experi-
ence and an apparent property F: is there something or other at
the perceiver that is (or has) F? In asking this question, we do
not pick out any particular object (as olfactory experience does
not allow for this). Rather, we ask whether there is anything at all
around that is F. And, due to its content, a question of this type
is the only one we can ask of when evaluating an olfactory expe-
rience for veridicality. Notice, however, that this question bears
similarities in form to O-Existence—the question that is meant to
capture a traditional notion of hallucination for olfactory experi-
ence. O-Existence asks whether a particular object that appears
to be F is around; the present question asks whether there is
anything around that is F. We do not ask whether F has been
misattributed to an object—as we would in O-Attribution—but
whether F-ness is instantiated at all. The only difference between
the present question and O-Existence is that it is not a particular
objects” to denote circumstances in which olfactory experience presents
particular objects, as an object-involving view of its content would have it.
7Note that it will not help here to argue that sometimes physical objects
(“source objects,” as we might call them) seem to have properties that they
do not in fact have. My claim is that, given the nature of the phenomenology
of olfactory experience, we are never in a position to know what particular
object has, or is the source, of the properties that we perceive. That is to say,
while olfactory experience predicates properties of “something or other,” it is
otherwise silent on the nature of that object—whether it be, in fact, an odor-
ous effluvium or a “source object.” Interrogating olfactory experience further
will not tell us what olfactory objects are. So, although we do attribute—and
at times incorrectly—properties to source objects, we do not do this on the
basis of olfactory experience alone. Arguably, when we do, we do so on the
basis of a network of background beliefs about source objects gained from
past experience and/or the exercise of other modalities in discovering those
sources. Again, those source objects are not revealed to us in olfactory experi-
ence itself and, as a result, any mistaken attribution to them we make does not
provide a counterexample to my conclusion.
object after which we ask. Instead, we ask after a certain property.
In each case, however, we ask whether it exists or, better yet, is
there.
Because of these similarities, I argue that it is understand-
able that the notion of an olfactory hallucination resonates with
us. To be sure, as it turns out it is not the traditional notion
of hallucination that does. But it is a notion of hallucination
nonetheless—and a novel one at that. As we have seen, when
olfactory experience is non-veridical, it incorrectly reports that
something or other at the perceiver has a certain property. But
this is just to say that when olfactory experience is non-veridical,
it incorrectly reports that a certain property is present in the per-
ceiver’s environment. As a result, I conclude that the notion of
non-veridicality that is suited to olfaction is one of property hallu-
cination. It is a notion of misrepresentation, or non-veridicality;
but it is one that is disengaged from any particular object. This
novel notion of non-veridicality explains two features of the olfac-
tory case. First, it provides the key to understanding why we are
comfortable with the notion of an olfactory hallucination, but not
comfortable with that of an olfactory illusion. Secondly, in pro-
viding a new way of thinking of non-veridicality for the olfactory
domain, it also solves the puzzle brought about by the conclusion
that there are no olfactory illusions. In particular, it draws atten-
tion to reasons for thinking that there are olfactory hallucinations
other than those provided by the traditional distinction between
illusion and hallucination8.
IN SUPPORT OF OLFACTORY ILLUSIONS: STEVENSON’S VIEW
In what follows, I will take the premises of my argument for
granted—in particular, the claim that, in the typical olfactory
case, olfactory experience does not achieve figure-ground seg-
regation and, in turn, object-involving status. Recently, Richard
Stevenson has responded to my argument that, based on these
considerations, there are no olfactory illusions 9. As we will see,
although his embody conclusions of empirical study, Stevenson’s
8One might worry that my claim that non-veridical olfactory experiences are
best characterized as property hallucinations blurs certain intuitive distinc-
tions that we make. For example, consider the two following cases: (1) a case
in which there is no odorant at all in the room, and yet you smell coffee, and
(2) a case in which there are only dry flowers in the room but in which you
misrepresent their smell as coffee. On my view, the experiences of each would
both count as property hallucinations. They are each cases in which, on the
abstract view, the content of their respective experiences will be the same.
And, in turn, in evaluating the veridicality of each, all we can ask is “is the
coffee smell instantiated?” Still, just because the content of olfactory experi-
ence does not distinguish between a case in which we have an odorant, or
odorant source, and one in which we do not, this is not to say that we can-
not maintain the intuitive difference between these two cases. It remains open
to explain that difference as a result of inference from past experience, back-
ground beliefs as well as the contribution of other sense modalities—the latter,
in particular, for the case of (2). See also fn. 7 for a related point.
9Stevenson does not directly address my notion of property hallucination.
Given that my arguments for property hallucination in the olfactory case turn
on my arguments against the existence of olfactory illusions, we can interpret
his failure to do so as resulting from his denial of my conclusion regarding
olfactory illusion. If there are olfactory illusions as tradition would have them,
then there is no need to posit a novel notion of non-veridicality for the olfac-
tory case. I will, however, return to the benefits of this novel notion later in
the paper.
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own examples of illusion comprise contextual and constancy
effects that could, or do, occur in day-to-day olfactory interac-
tions with the world. The empirical studies he cites simply make it
clearer that there are such effects. As the point of the present paper
is to examine whether Stevenson’s cases succeed in overturning
my arguments against olfactory illusions in these typical olfactory
cases, my and Stevenson’s question is the same: are standard cases
of non-veridicality for olfactory experience rightly characterized
as olfactory illusions?
Stevenson’s argument proceeds in two, roughly consecutive
stages. First, Stevenson argues that there are olfactory illusions by
drawing attention to those cases in which we find them. Secondly,
Stevenson examines why the notion of an olfactory illusion has
not resonated with us. In this way, his approach is like mine.
It is true, according to Stevenson, that we are (or have been)
uncomfortable with the notion of an olfactory illusion. Like me,
he believes that this is in need of explanation.
Stevenson begins by spending some time discussing the term
“illusion” and the kinds of phenomena that it denotes. He tells
us that the term “illusion” derives from the Latin “illusio” which,
as he cites, has the following meaning: “deceit, to mock or
make sport with, the saying of the opposite of what is meant”
(1888)10. Stevenson takes this definition to involve both an
objective and a subjective component. On the objective side, a
subject is presented with what is not the case—the “opposite” of
what is the case, as the definition states. In this way, the subject is
deceived, mocked, or made sport with. But, given that the subject
is deceived, she does not notice that there is a disparity between
the way the world is and what is being presented to her as the
case. Still, she is capable of noticing, Stevenson suggests, given the
right kind of circumstances or instruction. This is what Stevenson
means by the subjective component of the definition. I take it
that it is the term “deception” which “suggests a potential for
subjective awareness of [the] disparity” (1888); “illusion,” defined
in terms of “deception,” also carries with it that suggestion.
As Stevenson notes, these two aspects of the meaning of “illu-
sion” are not always apparent in the empirical literature on
olfaction. Rather, it is the objective component of the term that
has currency of use. Although there are subtle differences in the
use of “illusion” in the empirical literature, he tells us that, in gen-
eral, it is used to refer to “a disparity between some objective state
of the world and ones [sic] perception of it” (1888). This forms
what I will call his working definition of “illusion.” This definition,
he claims, captures those phenomena that psychologists accept as
cases of visual, auditory and somatosensory illusions. Although
Stevenson claims that this definition proves enough to pinpoint
cases of olfactory illusion, he recognizes that it leaves out any ref-
erence to an awareness of the misrepresentation. As he claims, this
omission is of little consequence for the cases of visual, auditory
and somatosensory illusions. But, as he argues, it has invited the
view that there are no olfactory illusions. As evidence of our resis-
tance to the notion of an olfactory illusion, he observes, like me,
that the indices of many popular perception textbooks, as well as
those of recent specialist books on olfaction, lack any mention of
olfactory illusion.
10All references to Stevenson will be to Stevenson (2011).
As a way drawing out to the difference between us, then,
Stevenson argues that we could take this evidence as indicating
one of two things: either (1) that there are no olfactory illusions
or (2) that those illusions escape notice. As I outlined above,
I argue for (1) and this itself explains our discomfort. As we
know, my arguments turn on the traditional distinction between
illusion and hallucination together with observations about the
phenomenology of olfactory experience. Because olfactory expe-
rience is not object-involving, the notion of an olfactory illusion
not only has no resonance with us, but also has no application
to the olfactory case. Unlike me, Stevenson opts for (2). After
arguing that there are cases in which olfactory illusions occur,
Stevenson claims that we are typically unaware of having expe-
rienced an olfactory illusion, and this accounts for why we might
think that there are none. He states this point in terms of verifi-
cation. We are not only typically unaware that we are undergoing
(or have undergone) an olfactory illusion; even if we suspected
that we were, we are unable in most cases to verify whether we
are (or were) in fact suffering one. Still, as he claims, we would be
mistaken to move from this epistemological point to the conclu-
sion that there are no olfactory illusions. Instead, we ought to see
our tendency to make this move as the result of a failure to appro-
priately consider the subjective aspect of themeaning of “illusion”
and realize that, unlike their visual, auditory and somatosensory
counterparts, olfactory illusions are not the kinds of things of
which we are typically aware.
In arguing for (2), however, Stevenson first provides evidence
against (1). It is his argument against (1) that I am primarily con-
cerned with in this paper. I will, however, turn to his argument
for (2) in my conclusion. At present, I turn to (1).
AGAINST (1): EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF OLFACTORY ILLUSIONS
My discussion of (1) proceeds in two stages, in line with what I
take to be the two arguments that Stevenson gives for the exis-
tence of olfactory illusions. His first argument forms the bulk of
his discussion and involves setting out examples of olfactory mis-
representation that fit his working definition of “illusion.” The
second of his arguments occurs in the discussion section of his
paper and requires substantial reconstruction. In doing so, we see
that Stevenson employs a further notion of illusion—one that, I
argue, is the same as the traditional notion that I adopt. Given
this, we see that there are two notions of illusion at work in his
paper. I will argue that Stevenson is not successful in showing that,
in accordance with either of these two notions, there are olfactory
illusions.
Let us turn, then, to the first stage of Stevenson’s argument.
According to Stevenson, what are the cases that we can rightly
describe as those of olfactory illusions? Given his working defini-
tion of “illusion,” each involves a “disparity” (1888), as he puts
it, between the way the world is and one’s experience of it. In
turn, his arguments assume that there is indeed an objective way
that the world is with respect to olfactory phenomena (e.g., qual-
ity, intensity, hedonic value), and one that could in principle be
accurately represented in olfactory experience. As he puts it: “[a]
misperception assumes that there is a veridical state, in which the
mind accurately reflects some objective state of the environment”
(1893).
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According to Stevenson, cases meeting his working definition
fall into two categories, each defined by the type of disparity
that exists between the external stimulus and a subject’s experi-
ence11. There are the cases in which the same stimulus is experi-
enced differently by a given subject at different times. And there
are the cases in which different stimuli are experienced by a sub-
ject as the same. According to Stevenson, both of these types of
disparity parallel accepted cases of illusion in other modalities12.
Let us consider cases of same stimulus-different percept first.
According to Stevenson, this category contains a set of cases
in which context is thought to affect olfactory experience—in
particular, contextual effects of perceived quality, intensity, and
hedonic value. In what follows, I will set out several examples
of these contextual effects. Stevenson does provide more cases
for each category. He also provides examples of variation in the
perceived location of a chemical stimulus, as well as an example
of an olfactory analog of binocular rivalry. I will set aside these
latter two cases. For my purposes, it is enough to consider the
perceptual phenomena that fall under the category of “contextual
effects13.”
In the qualitative category, Stevenson tells us that experiments
have shown that the compound dihydromyrcenal is perceived
to be more “woody” when smelled in the context of citrus
smelling odors, and more “citrusy” when smelled in the context
of “woody” smelling odors. In each case, the stimulus remains
the same; how a subject perceives that stimulus to be—i.e., the
odorant’s apparent properties—changes given what other odors
it is perceived alongside. If we recall that Stevenson’s working
11In discussing Stevenson’s examples, I adopt his use of “disparity” to refer to
that difference between the way things appear and the way that they are. It is a
term that is rarely used in the philosophical literature, with philosophers often
adopting characterizations in terms of the inaccuracy of a representation.
12I will avoid going into the details of these illusions in other modalities. For
present purposes, it enough to note that he thinks that there is this parallel.
13I set aside cases of perceived location and binaral rivalry for reasons other
than brevity. To give Stevenson’s discussion of olfactory localization full treat-
ment would involve dealing with difficult questions regarding the status of
the retronasal as truly olfactory. Given that my claims regarding olfactory illu-
sion center on orthonasal olfaction, I consider only the orthonasal. I set aside
his consideration of binaral rivalry because it isn’t clear that it constitutes an
illusion, even in his working sense. In the case of binaral presentation, one’s
olfactory experience switches back and forth from the presentation of an odor
located discretely at one nostril to an odor located discretely at the other. In
each case, the odorant is indeed at the nostril at which one’s experience rep-
resents it as being. What one’s experience does not represent is that there is
another odorant present at the other nostril. (Assume that experience gets the
quality and intensity “right.” He does not claim that there is any other disparity
that that of localization.) But surely in each case (switching from one nostril
to the other) one’s experience “accurately reflects some objective state of the
world” (1888)—namely, that a certain odorant is located at a certain nostril.
What it does not report is that there is an additional odorant located at the
other. But this is just a failure to perceive something in one’s environment. By
Stevenson’s own lights, the experience hasn’t conveyed any information that is
false; it has simply failed to convey all of the information about the perceiver’s
environment. Accurately representing some objective state of the environment
does not involve representing every feature of that environment. That is too
strict a constraint on veridicality—arguably one that we would never meet.
What matters for determining whether an experience is veridical is whether
what experience does represent is represented correctly—i.e., veridically.
definition of an illusion is “a disparity between some objective
state of the world and ones [sic] perception of it” (1888), then
it would seem that such a case meets this definition. Given that,
in each case, the target odorant appears to be “more F,” for some
apparent property F, the implication is that there is some way that
the target odorant is, irrespective of context 14. On Stevenson’s
definition, then, both the “more citrusy” and “more woody”
contextual effects constitute illusions with respect to perceived
quality.
Stevenson claims that similar effects are reported for perceived
intensity and hedonic value. For example, in the case of inten-
sity ratings, experiments have shown that intensity ratings of a
range of odor concentrations are affected by intermediate expo-
sure to the same stimulus at weaker, or stronger, concentrations.
So, for example, if after having initially rated the intensity lev-
els of a range of odor concentrations subjects are then exposed
to a stronger concentration of the same odorant as a biasing
task, those subjects later judge the initial concentration range
to be less intense. And, as Stevenson tells us, the opposite effect
results from intermediate exposure to a weaker concentration.
According to Stevenson, this is a case in which there is a dispar-
ity between the objective state of the stimulus, as he would put
it, and a subject’s perception of it. As in the case of perceived
quality above, the stimulus remains unchanged throughout the
experiment; however, how that stimulus appears to be—that is,
its perceived intensity—changes given the context of perception,
in this case one created by the biasing task. The suggestion is
that, prior to the biasing task, there is no disparity between the
intensity properties of the stimulus and the subject’s perception
of them. It is only after the biasing task that the subject suffers an
illusion with respect to the intensity of that stimulus.
Finally, in the category of hedonic judgment, Stevenson cites
a series of experiments in which labels reflecting positive and
negative contexts have been shown to affect judgment of the
pleasantness of an odorant stimulus. As he tells us, in a particular
experiment, previous exposure with the label “toilet cleaner” (i.e.,
a negative context) affects the judgment of a pine odor’s pleas-
antness in later contexts labeled “Christmas tree” (i.e., a positive
context). Similarly, initial exposure to the same odorant with the
label “Christmas tree” affects judgment of its pleasantness in later
context labeled “toilet cleaner.” In the first case, perceivers judged
the shift in pleasantness to be less than they did in the second case,
when the labels were reversed. This is despite the odorant stimu-
lus remaining constant throughout. Verbal labels, then, can affect
judgments of pleasantness.
Although Stevenson does not state this explicitly, these are, for
him, cases of illusion because of the relation that experience bears
to our hedonic judgments. In particular, the case suggests that
those judgments are made on the basis of experience such that
a difference in judgment indicates a difference in the associated
olfactory experience. It is only if this is true that differences in
14In line with Stevenson’s characterization of illusion, I take it that this is a
feature of the odorant that could in principle be represented veridically in
olfactory experience. In what follows, I will leave out reference to these coun-
terfactual circumstances. But it should remain understood that, according to
Stevenson, they could obtain.
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hedonic judgment could tell us anything about the existence of
illusions in the olfactory case. For illusions are cases of perceptual
misrepresentation, as Stevenson claims earlier; they cannot only
be matters of inaccuracy of judgment—although, if we take our
illusory experiences at face value, our judgments will be inaccu-
rate as well. With this in mind, it is clear that, for Stevenson, cases
of variation in hedonic judgment involve a disparity between
some objective state of the stimulus and a subject’s perception
of it. The stimulus remains the same, after all. To be sure, in
the experiment he cites, this disparity might underlie each of the
subject’s initial judgments, given that in both cases the odorant
is perceived with verbal labels. It might be that “the veridical
state, in which the mind accurately reflects some objective state of
the environment” (1893) is one had in the absence of any verbal
label. (And, prima facie, this seems plausible). Despite this, even
double disparity in this case shows that, on Stevenson’s working
definition, there are cases of olfactory illusion. That is, if both
labeling cases are ones of disparity, then so much the better for
his argument that there are olfactory illusions15.
Now to cases of different stimulus-same percept. In this
category, Stevenson cites two instances of perceptual stability,
or constancy phenomena. The first example involves intensity.
According to Stevenson, research has found that variations in the
flow and, in turn, concentration of an odorant over the olfac-
tory epithelium is registered by neural responses of the olfactory
nerve. Despite this, such variation does not arise at the level
of experience. Rather, despite variation in the concentration of
an odorant passing over the olfactory epithelium, subjects per-
ceive odor stimuli as relatively stable with respect to intensity.
Stevenson suggests that these results show that the epithelium is
not only sensitive to the stimulus itself, but to the rate of airflow
over it. Due to this added sensitivity, the olfactory system adjusts
for variations in concentration relative to changes in airflow. The
result is constancy with respect to the perceived intensity of the
stimulus. Given Stevenson’s working definition of “illusion,” we
have a case where there is disparity between the objective state of
the stimulus and the nature of the experience resulting from it.
In this case, we have a difference in odorant concentration that
fails to show up at the level of experience. This subdued sensitiv-
ity to differences in an odorant stimulus amounts to an illusion,
Stevenson suggests, because a veridical experience of it would rep-
resent its actual concentration (presumably in the form of what
we call intensity of olfactory quality). Because that actual con-
centration is not represented at the level experience, Stevenson
indicates that atleast some of our representation of concentration
is illusory16.
15Stevenson cites similar experiments in which a target stimulus is judged to
be more pleasant if presented with odorants that are typically judged to be less
pleasant, and less pleasant if presented with odorants that are typically judged
to be more pleasant. Again, it must be that, for Stevenson, underlying cases
of variation in hedonic judgment is a disparity between some objective state
of the stimulus and a subject’s experience of it. If this is true, these cases also
constitute illusions on his working definition of “illusion.”
16Given that Stevenson presents these as relatively common instances of per-
ceptual constancy, it might turn out that much of our representation of
concentration is illusory. It is unclear whether this is something that Stevenson
would be happy to accept. One way to avoid that result would be to claim
Stevenson’s second example involves constancy in perceived
quality despite differences in, or changes to, the chemical con-
stitution of an odorant stimulus. Drawing on work he presents
in Wilson and Stevenson (2006, 2007), Stevenson tells us that
degraded input, or varying formulations of a stimulus at the
receptor site, can be completed at the level of experience. Because
of the complexity of the olfactory environment, one might not
receive information about all of the components of a certain
odor stimulus, for example coffee, and yet still be able to smell
that that coffee is present. What accounts for this ability are
prior encodings of odorant stimuli in the form of stored tem-
plates of patterns of receptor excitation in the olfactory cortex.
As Stevenson claims, a “perfect fit” (1892) between input and
template is not required; rather the olfactory system is able to
recognize certain sub-patterns of receptor activation against exist-
ing templates of activation. The result is, however, not a “partial”
experience of coffee; it is an experience of coffee. Without these
templates, Wilson and Stevenson (2006, 2007) claim, it is unclear
how such constancy might be achieved. Like constancy of inten-
sity, then, it would seem we have a case where there is disparity
between the objective state of the stimulus and the nature of
the experience resulting from it. In this case, we have a differ-
ence in chemical constitution that fails to show up at the level
of experience.
In sum, Stevenson alleges that all of the cases of same
stimulus-different experience and different stimulus-same expe-
rience involve misrepresentation and, in particular, illusion. He
argues that each case involves a circumstance in which there is a
disparity between some objective state of the world and a subject’s
experience of that state. In accordance with his working definition
of “illusion,” then, these are all cases of illusion.
OLFACTORY ILLUSIONS?
In what follows, I will take for granted that each of these cases is
one that we can assess for veridicality. I will also take for granted
that there is some objective state of the world that our olfac-
tory experience is capable of misrepresenting and does so in each
of these cases. Given these assumptions, I want to now consider
whether, or how, Stevenson’s arguments affect my own.
As a way of making headway on these questions, it is impor-
tant to first note that my notion of non-veridicality could handle
these cases of alleged illusion 17. Recall that my notion of non-
veridicality involves the consideration of whether, for a certain
olfactory feature F, there is anything at all at the perceiver that is F.
So, to take the case of dihydromyrcenal as an example, evaluating
the “more woody” case for veridicality involves asking whether
there is anything at all at the perceiver that has, objectively, that
degree of woodiness. Or, as I have also put it, it involves simply
that olfactory experience represents concentration relative to air flow over the
epithelium. In this case, our judgments of intensity would be more eligible for
accuracy at the level of experience. I leave this proposal, however, for another
time. The important point is that it is not a proposal that Stevenson wishes to
entertain, opting instead for claims of illusion in these cases.
17In what follows, I will simply refer to my notion of non-veridicality for the
olfactory case, as opposed to my notion of property hallucination for it. Given
that I argue that the latter is the only way that (human) olfactory experience
can be non-veridical, there is no room for confusion here.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research March 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 231 | 6
Batty The illusion confusion
asking whether, in those perceptual circumstances, that degree of
woodiness is instantiated. If the answer is “no,” then the expe-
rience is non-veridical. As I am assuming with Stevenson, that
degree of woodiness is not instantiated at the perceiver—there is
nothing at all that is “more woody” at the perceiver. In this case,
then, the answer to my question is “no,” and one’s experience in
this circumstance counts as non-veridical.
Notice, however, that my notion of non-veridicality for olfac-
tory experience is no different than Stevenson’s notion of illusion.
Remember that, according to Stevenson, an illusory experience
involves “a disparity between some objective state of the world
and ones [sic] perception of it” (1888). But this is just what,
on my notion of non-veridicality for olfactory experience, a
non-veridical experience involves. To consider whether F-ness is
instantiated at a perceiver is to consider whether the perceiver’s
experience “accurately reflects some state of [her] environment”
(1893). If it does not, then there is a disparity between that
state of the environment and a perceiver’s experience of it. To
return to the case of one’s experience of the woodiness of dihy-
dromyrcenal, Stevenson’s notion of illusion requires that we ask
whether that degree of woodiness is instantiated by some state
of the environment, where “environment” presumably denotes
the space around the perceiver eligible for inhalation 18. But my
notion of non-veridicality asks the same—that s, whether that
degree of woodiness is instantiated at the perceiver. Given what
Stevenson has told us, then, “Does S’s experience of F-ness accu-
rately reflect some state of the environment?” amounts to asking
“Given that S has an experience of F-ness, is F-ness instantiated at
the perceiver?” Just like Stevenson’s notion of illusion, my notion
of non-veridicality does not ask after any particular thing that
appears to be F. Rather, in asking whether anything at all instan-
tiates F-ness, it asks whether, to use Stevenson’s terms, there is a
state of the environment in which F-ness is instantiated.
As it stands, then, Stevenson’s working notion of illusion fails
to address my arguments against olfactory illusions. Both of us
provide the same analysis of his cases. But if we truly disagree,
then we ought to provide different analyses of them. At this point,
then, any purported disagreement between us amounts to a mere
difference in terminology. He calls his cases of disparity illusions,
while I do not. But, other than that label, our characterizations of
them amount to the same. Because of this, if Stevenson is to refute
my arguments, he must do more to address them directly.
I hinted at what else is required above when I claimed that,
because my notion of non-veridicality does not ask after any par-
ticular thing that appears to be F, it amounts to the question
of whether there is a state of the environment in which F-ness
is instantiated. My conclusion that there are no olfactory illu-
sions hinges on the observation that olfactory experience is not
object-involving, that there are no presented objects in olfactory
experience. Recall that, on that traditional way of categorizing
non-veridical experience, both illusion and hallucination involve
18If “environment” denoted anything greater, then we would have to count as
veridical cases in which there is nothing at a perceiver that is F, although there
appears to be, but in which there is something “farther out” in the perceiver’s
surroundings that is F—although the perceiver does not take any of that odor
in. Presumably we want to still count these cases as non-veridical.
what I call object-failure—that is, a failure to represent a partic-
ular object accurately. If there are no presented objects, then that
categorization fails. And, as I argue, there are no such objects. This
is because the very nature of olfactory experience—its “smudgi-
ness,” as I have put it—doesn’t allow for a distinction between
figure and ground. These considerations of phenomenology con-
stitute my reasons for denying that there are olfactory illusions.
What is required for Stevenson to address my arguments, then, is
an argument for the conclusion that, in the cases of alleged illu-
sion he cites, there is a presented object that appears to be other
than it is.
Stevenson appears to argue for just this in his later discussion
section—although he does not turn back directly to his exam-
ple cases. Before moving on to these arguments, it is important
to note some potentially misleading claims that Stevenson makes
when introducing this discussion. After presenting his alleged
cases of olfactory illusion, Stevenson claims that “the apparent
actuality of olfactory illusions would seem to call into question
Batty’s (2010b) claim that olfactory experience lacks object status”
(1895). As it stands, this claim is far too quick. It carries with it
the implication that Stevenson has discussed his cases of olfactory
illusion in terms of presented objects. But he does not make any
claim of the sort, focusing instead on states of the environment.
But, as we have seen, casting these alleged cases of illusion in terms
of mere states of the environment is not enough to address my
arguments. As it stands, then, “the apparent actuality of olfactory
illusions” does not “call into question Batty’s (2010b) claim that
olfactory experience lacks object status” (1895) 19. As I claimed
above, more needs to be said to establish this claim.
Stevenson then seems to recognize this when he goes on to
claim that olfactory experiences do in fact achieve “object sta-
tus” (1895). Although he cites other authors who have claimed
that olfactory experience achieves object status, it is most help-
ful to consider what Stevenson himself has argued with respect
to this claim. Wilson and Stevenson (2006, 2007) argue for an
object-based model of theorizing about olfaction, a model they
call the Object Recognition Model (from hereon ORM). In par-
ticular, they argue that olfactory experiences represent “olfactory
objects.” Given that they also refer to these objects as “odor
objects,” it is safe to assume that, on the ORM, the objects
represented in olfactory experience correspond to odors—or, col-
lections of volatile molecules in a perceiver’s environment. One of
their common examples is the “coffee object.”
Returning to a type of view about content that I discussed
in section one, we will see that the ORM suggests that olfactory
experience is object-involving—that is, that it represents that a
particular object is present in your environment as opposed to
some object or other, as my abstract view maintains. In turn,
this suggests that Stevenson’s notion of illusion at this point of
his paper is in fact the more robust, traditional notion rather
than the “working definition” that he relies on previously. If
19Strictly speaking, I do not deny that olfactory experiences lack object status.
I argue that olfactory experiences represent objects, just not particular objects,
and not in a way that allows for olfactory illusion. That is, I argue that olfac-
tory experience is not object-involving. Given this, I will assume that by “lacks
object status” Stevenson means “is not object-involving.”
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olfactory experience is object-involving, then it is eligible for mis-
representation in both of the traditional ways. In particular, to
return to a previous question, we can ask of an object of olfactory
experience, o:
For any property F that o appears to have, does o really have F?
(O-Attribution)
That is, there is some particular thing of which we can ask, as in
O-Attribution, “it appears to be F, but is it really as it appears?”
But O-Attribution is the question that captures the traditional
notion of illusion. If the ORM is true, then, my claim there are
no olfactory illusions is shown false.
What are we to make of the ORM? If the ORM is to encompass
a successful response to my argument against olfactory illusions,
then olfactory experience must single out objects in the requisite
way—that is, it must be object-involving. As a way of understand-
ing why Wilson and Stevenson think it does, it is important to
look briefly at the traditional model of theorizing about olfaction
that their ORM aims to replace—and why it does so. They call
this model the Stimulus Response Model (from hereon, SRM).
Given the history of scientific theorizing about olfaction, we can
extract two core claims of the SRM. First, the SRM assumes
that olfactory experience is analytic—that is, those features of a
chemical stimulus that trigger receptor excitation will map onto
features of the resulting experience. In other words, the SRM
claims that, in some important sense, olfactory experience can be
“broken down” into those initial features of the stimulus and/or
receptor types sensitive to those features. Secondly, and relatedly,
the SRM assumes that a characterization of olfactory experi-
ences is exhausted by an account of how the particular features
of the stimulus and/or receptor site are presented in experience.
On the SRM, no appeal to objects is necessary to provide that
characterization.
According to Wilson and Stevenson, the SRM proves unsat-
isfactory because olfactory experience doesn’t live up to the stan-
dards that the SRM sets for it. This is because olfactory experience
is, as they tell us, largely synthetic. That is to say, rather than pro-
ducing an experience of an array of discriminable properties, the
various properties of the stimulus produce a largely irreducible
experience—a “wholistic unitary percept” (2007, 1821), as they
put it. One particularly telling way that they deliver this point
is by asking us to consider the complexity of the average odor-
ant stimulus. Much of what we encounter with our noses are
chemical mixtures. The coffee odor, for instance, consists of over
600 volatile compounds that together give rise to what we might
call the “coffee experience.” It is a distinctive experience—one
that gets us up in the morning. But it is not an experience in
which we are able to discriminate anything close to the number of
causally efficacious components of the stimulus responsible for it.
As it’s been noted in the empirical literature, it is now commonly
accepted that even the experts are only ever able to distinguish two
or three of the major components that constitute a given odor.
So, while the coffee stimulus has a remarkable complexity, it does
not have a perceived complexity 20. Compared to the complexity
of the stimulus itself, the coffee experience is simple. It’s just of
20This would explain why we are surprised to hear of the complexity of the
coffee odor.
coffee. But this is not the way that our experience of the coffee odor
should be if the SRM is true. Although, as Wilson and Stevenson
concede, olfactory experience can fail to be wholly synthetic, if it
were analytic, our experience of the coffee odor would be different
than it in fact is. We might think that, if the SRM were true, there
would be no such thing as the coffee smell per se—just an array of
apparent properties. But there is. Given this, the SRM fails to cap-
ture the phenomenological facts of our experience. Wilson and
Stevenson therefore conclude that it is a misguided model and
must be rejected.
In place of the SRM, Wilson and Stevenson propose the ORM.
We already know that such a view is object-based, that olfac-
tory experience represents “olfactory objects,” or “odor objects.”
We also know that it is safe to assume, given to their name, that
these objects correspond to odors in our environment. But, what
are these perceptual objects? Or, to put it another way, in what
sense do odors in the environment show up at the level of expe-
rience? Their criticism of the SRM provides the answer to this
question. According to Wilson and Stevenson, odors show up as
those “wholistic unitary percepts” (2007, 1821), as the synthetic
percepts that the SRM fails to predict. The “coffee object,” then, is
that largely synthetic percept that results from sniffing the coffee
odor.
Now, it is not simply because olfactory experience is largely
synthetic that Wilson and Stevenson claim it is object-involving.
It is rather what it can achieve as a result of its being synthetic that
they claim secures the view. According to Wilson and Stevenson,
the “defining feature for [perceptual] objecthood” (2007, 1823) is
figure-ground segregation, and they argue that olfactory experi-
ence can achieve just that 21. Their reasons for thinking so draw
on similar considerations as those of Stevenson’s case of con-
stancy of perceived quality22. In order to draw attention to how
olfactory experience achieves figure-ground segregation, Wilson
and Stevenson ask us to consider the complexity of our olfac-
tory environment. At any given moment, we are barraged with
volatile molecules given off by the various things in our environ-
ment. Insofar as almost everything in our environment gives off
these molecules, we can say that everything smells. And a remark-
able number of those molecules make their way to the olfactory
epithelia with every intake of breath. Despite this, our olfactory
system is able to achieve the most impressive of discriminatory
feats. In the midst of the “confusion” of our olfactory environ-
ment, as they put it, we are able to smell coffee. The “wholistic
unitary percept” (2007, 1821) coffee is an apparent figure, one
that stands out in the midst of a complex, and noisy, background.
This “experiential prominence” in the midst of that noisy back-
ground is what Wilson and Stevenson refer to as figure-ground
segregation.
It must be noted, however, that, unlike the visual case, Wilson
and Stevenson claim that figure-ground segregation is achieved
aspatially. According to Wilson and Stevenson, olfactory expe-
rience is, in and of itself, aspatial. To return to our previous
example, the coffee object is an apparent object—just not one that
21According to Wilson and Stevenson (2007), they adopt this definition from
Kubovy and Van Valkenburg (2001).
22See page 6 of this paper.
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is presented in space. Still, according to Wilson and Stevenson,
given experiential prominence and, in turn, the achievement of
figure-ground segregation, it is an apparent object nonetheless.
After all, figure-ground segregation is, for them, the defining
feature of perceptual objecthood and, if correctly characterized
as such and achieved, constitutes the presentation of an object.
Wilson and Stevenson agree with me, then, in an important
respect—namely, that spatial figure-ground segregation is not
something that applies to olfactory experience. Other than myself
and Stevenson’s common focus on standard olfactory experi-
ences, then, there is an additional point of agreement between us.
But is this enough to show that, in such cases, olfactory experience
presents objects and, in turn, is eligible to be illusory?
As a way of answering this question and in order to compare
our respective views, we need to say something more about the
ORM. According to Wilson and Stevenson, underlying experi-
ential prominence is the template mechanism that I referred to
earlier, in my discussion of Stevenson’s case of constancy of per-
ceived quality23. Wilson and Stevenson argue that, over time, the
olfactory system builds up a store of templates in the olfactory
cortex of patterns of receptor input. Once stored, these tem-
plates allow the system to recognize those patterns against variable
arrays of receptor input. In turn, this kind of processing endows
us with important discriminatory abilities such as the ability
to smell coffee although there are other smelly things about.
Contributing to these achievements, then, are learning and mem-
ory. In short, the growing store of templates constitutes learning;
drawing on those templates in processing olfactory information
amounts to the execution of memory24.
If experiential prominence is rightly characterized as figure-
ground segregation, then Wilson and Stevenson’s view is one
according to which olfactory experience is object-involving. This
is because the very nature of figure-ground segregation is such
that it allows a perceiver to single out a particular object in her
environment.Wemust now consider whether experiential promi-
nence demonstrates that olfactory experience is object-involving
and, in turn, secures the claim that it achieves figure-ground
segregation.
It is not clear that experiential prominence establishes this. The
problem lies in the fact that my view is consistent with all of the
phenomenological data that Wilson and Stevenson cite. In order
to see that this is so, let’s return to the coffee example and look at
what my view of olfactory representation is able to say about this
case. On my view, when we smell the coffee, there is a distinctive
property, or set of properties, presented to us in olfactory experi-
ence. I will also grant that, in certain circumstances, that property,
or set of properties, stands out from other properties instantiated
in a perceiver’s environment—namely in those circumstances in
which we smell coffee. Given the complexity of the olfactory envi-
ronment, and the way that olfactory experience is given those
facts, it would be foolish to deny this experiential prominence.
Moreover, I can also grant Wilson and Stevenson’s claim that, in
23Again, see page 6 of this paper.
24Wilson and Stevenson say much more about the physical mechanisms
underlying what I have referred to as “template mechanisms.” For my pur-
poses, it is enough to provide a model of their view.
olfactory experience, such prominence is achieved in virtue of a
relative match between stored templates in the olfactory cortex
and patterns of receptor excitation. Where my view will differ
from Wilson and Stevenson’s is in what the result of that tem-
plate matching is—that is, in what that experiential prominence
amounts to. Onmy view, it amounts to the presentation of a prop-
erty, or a small set of properties presented together as a result of
that template matching25. This much is in keeping with Wilson
and Stevenson. But, unlike whatWilson and Stevenson claim, that
those properties “show up” at the level of experience indicates the
presence of some object—just not any object in particular.
Notice that, at this point, I have granted all of the perceptual
data that Wilson and Stevenson cite in favor of figure-ground
segregation. In doing so, I stop short of positing that the presen-
tation of those properties, as distinct in a complex environment,
amounts to the presentation of a particular object. But, again, it
does not stop short at the expense of any of the perceptual data
that Wilson and Stevenson cite in favor their view. In particular,
and most importantly, that data that they take to be indicative
of figure-ground segregation is accounted for without taking that
step.
What this shows is that it isn’t clear that experiential promi-
nence is best characterized as figure-ground segregation. This is
because, as a comparison with my view has demonstrated, Wilson
and Stevenson haven’t shown that it is an apparent figure that
shows up at the level of experience. But demonstrating that there
is such a figure—or object—is exactly what is required in order to
establish that the more robust notion of illusion is one that can
occur in olfactory experience. To return to our previous ques-
tion, Stevenson must establish that O-Attribution is a question
that we can ask of olfactory experience. But his own “object-
based” view of olfactory experience does not. Given this, he fails
to demonstrate that my claim there are no olfactory illusions is
false.
It is important to note that responding to present worries
about ruling out my abstract view requires more that simply
drawing attention to the fact that there exist patterns of exci-
tation at the receptoral level, nor to the fact that that such
patterns are stored in long-term memory to expedite later olfac-
tory discrimination. What is at issue is whether these patterns
and combinations show up, at the level of experience, as percep-
tual objects. The question is whether the experiential output of
template matching—Wilson and Stevenson’s “wholistic unitary
percepts” or “synthetic odor objects”—ought to be characterized
in object-involving terms. And it isn’t clear that there are the
materials with which to adjudicate between that kind of view and
25Here I am not claiming that olfactory experience achieves the perceptual
grouping required to solve the Many Properties Problem. I am simply, for
the sake of comparison, adopting Wilson and Stevenson’s claim that, in some
cases, we are able to distinguish two or three components of an odorant stimu-
lus. While they claim that, even in these cases, we are presented with olfactory
objects, I here claim that a view that denies that there are such objects can
accommodate the data they cite. It is important to note that amongst the
data they cite is not the claim that olfactory experience can report on differ-
ent arrangements of those properties along some dimension—e.g., the spatial
dimension. But it is this kind of achievement that underlies the ability of a
sensory system to solve the Many Properties Problem.
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mine—at least if we are relying on observations of experiential
prominence to decide it.
Are we now left at an impasse, with each of us able to account
for the relevant data and nothing left to adjudicate the issue?
I think that we are not. I grant that figure-ground segregation
allows us to single out a particular object in our environment.
That is, I grant that figure-ground segregation forms the basis of
object-involving content. Wilson and Stevenson agree. But they
also assume something stronger than I do: that if the distinction
is to apply in the realm of olfaction, it must apply non-spatially.
But not only has this revision of the concept proven problem-
atic, it also deprives us of the ordinary spatial notion of figure
ground, a notion which we do need—just not for humans. To see
that this is so, compare our olfactory experiences to those of other
animals. The hammerhead shark, for example, enjoys a sense of
smell that is directional. Given its extremely wide head, a stimu-
lus coming from the extreme left of the hammerhead’s head will
arrive at the left nasal cavity before it does the right. If the stim-
ulus is blood, the hammerhead’s response is instantaneous— it
turns in the direction of its source. I take it that we are quite
happy to admit that the hammerhead represents the location of
a food source, much in the same way that we are able to repre-
sent, via audition, the location of a “bang” outside. In the latter
case, we are happy to admit that auditory experience achieves
figure-ground segregation—and does so spatially. Given this, it
is plausible to conclude that the hammerhead also achieves the
same in its olfactory experience. That is to say, the hammerhead
shark is a creature that enjoys spatial figure ground representa-
tion and thus object-involving olfactory content. Clearly we are
not like the hammerhead, as Wilson and Stevenson admit. But
it would be strange to conclude that the hammerhead’s olfactory
experiences are to be evaluated according to one notion of figure-
ground segregation, while ours are not. If we are to account for
the difference between us and the hammerhead, then, we require
the spatial notion of figure-ground segregation.
What this shows is that the spatial notion of figure-ground
segregation remains useful in the olfactory case. We can make
distinctions with it that we need to make—for example, we can
explain the difference between us and the hammerheads. What’s
more, it allows for a unified notion of figure-ground segrega-
tion across the sense modalities. In those types of experience in
which we think of figure-ground segregation as achieved—vision,
audition and touch, for example—we do so on the basis of the
richness of its spatial representation. In those types of experiences
in which we worry whether, or wonder if, figure-ground segre-
gation is achieved—arguably olfaction and taste—I take it that
we so on the basis of the observation that those types of expe-
riences are not as spatially rich as those where we grant happily
that there is figure-ground segregation. What this suggests is that
figure-ground segregation forms a kind, one defined by the type
of spatial representation achieved by an experience.
If, as I have argued above, we ought to evaluate olfactory
experience in accordance with this notion of figure-ground seg-
regation, then we ought to accept my abstract view. And, if we
accept that view, then we are committed to accepting three fur-
ther things. First, we are committed to accepting my analysis of
experiential prominence over Wilson and Stevenson’s, driven as
mine is by the abstract view of olfactory content. Second, and
relatedly, we ought to accept my conclusion that there are no
olfactory illusions. Finally, given the accuracy conditions set forth
by the content of olfactory experience, we ought to accept that
the appropriate notion of non-veridicality for the olfactory case is
one of property hallucination.
Now Stevenson says little about the notion of property hal-
lucination per se, focusing instead on the negative stage of my
2010b argument that there are no olfactory illusions. Still, let me
say something further about the benefits of adopting a notion
of property hallucination and of a non-object based notion of
non-veridicality. Scientists and philosophers alike have long been
interested in non-veridicality, or perceptual misrepresentation.
But it has also been assumed that non-veridicality falls into one of
two categories—illusion and hallucination. As I noted in section
1, these ordinary notions each involve the misrepresentation of
objects, or “object-failure,” as I have called it. It is true that, with
property hallucination, I am also talking about non-veridicality.
But what is interesting about property hallucination is that it is a
form of non-veridicality that current accounts of non-veridicality
do not allow for, focused as they are on the representation of par-
ticular objects. Drawing attention to property hallucination, then,
identifies a new category of non-veridicality. Given that both sci-
entists and philosophers have been interested in the information
putatively conveyed in olfactory experience, and the nature of the
ways in which experience may misinform a subject, the introduc-
tion of property hallucination presents a novel way of thinking
about, and categorizing, olfactory misrepresentation.
But the interest of property hallucination for olfaction is not
only restricted to the olfactory case. It is also helpful in driving
further thinking about perceptual experience in general. That is,
its introduction forces us to re-think the nature of veridicality
and non-veridicality more generally across all of perceptual expe-
rience. For example, the notion of property hallucination opens
up the possibility that there are cases in other modalities that are
best characterized as those in which we do not perceive particu-
lar objects but only certain properties, and that this novel notion
of non-veridicality best accounts for those cases. One case that I
have discussed previously is the visual experience of looking at
a uniformly colored expanse 26. To be sure, this is not a typical
visual experience, as I argue the analog case for olfaction is; but it
is one that, if in fact a misrepresentation of color, is plausibly cat-
egorized as a case of property hallucination. A third category of
non-veridicality, then, is incredibly interesting because it allows
us to look deeper at the experiences of other modalities, compar-
ing and contrasting the ways in which experiences in those can
mislead.
Finally, adopting my third category of non-veridicality directs
our attention to the possibility that there might be even further
categories of non-veridicality—whether these other, previously
unconsidered notions turn out to be categories in their own right,
or sub-species of those we already adopt. Not only, then, does
my notion of property hallucination introduce a new category
that we previously lacked in describing perceptual misrepresen-
tation; it also directs attention to the possibility that our account
26See for example, Batty (2011).
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of non-veridicality might be lacking in further, equally interest-
ing, ways. And this further result, I take it, would be interesting
for philosophers and scientists alike.
CONCLUSION
Earlier I promised to say something further about what I labeled
Stevenson’s (2), namely his claim that olfactory illusions typically
escape notice. Obviously I disagree that they do. I argue that there
are no olfactory illusions and so there is nothing in this case to
escape our notice. Still, my abstract view of content can explain
why we might think, like Stevenson claims, that the difference
between olfaction and other modalities, “relates to issues of ver-
ification (i.e., ones [sic] capacity to independently confirm what
one is smelling” (1888). To take the case of vision as an example,
it is easy to see how we are able to verify what we seem to see. In
the case of visual experience, because we are able to discriminate
individual objects, we are able to ask, and in principle capable of
verifying, whether that object is in fact in the scene before our
eyes. Given that it is presented as such, we are also in princi-
ple capable of verifying whether the properties it appears to have
are those that the object in fact has. In each case, we go out and
explore the environment; we go to that object that we appear to
see and “interrogate” further. These two capacities for verification
are implied by our previous two questions about misperception,
V-Existence and V-Attribution.
But, as I have argued, the olfactory analogs of each—O-
Existence and O-Attribution—do not in fact apply to olfactory
experience. This is because there are no presented objects in olfac-
tory experience; olfactory experience is not object-involving. It is
unclear, then, how we are able to verify what we smell. Like the
visual case, we may very well explore our environment further;
but it is not the case that we are able to pinpoint that object we
appear to smell and “interrogate” it further. The most we are able
to do is locate those properties we appear to smell, to determine if
it is in fact what we thought it was, or if it appears to be elsewhere
around us. But notice that this is just to ask after whether a prop-
erty, or set of properties, is instantiated in the environment. It is
not to ask after any particular object.
It is no wonder, then, we feel suspicious about our abilities to
verify our olfactory experiences. We simply are unable to do so
in the same way as we are in the visual case. But, unlike what
Stevenson claims, this difference is a result of the fact that there
are no presented objects. In fact, if we take Wilson and Stevenson
at their word, then it would seem that we would be able to ver-
ify what we smell in the much stronger sense of “verification”
present in the visual case. That is, we ought to be able to pinpoint
a particular object in our environment and ask after it. But we
cannot. Not only, then, is abstract view vindicated with respect to
its claims about olfactory illusions; it is also able to explain those
considerations about verification that, as it turns out, Stevenson
himself is unable to accommodate.
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